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By Arnold Duncan McNair.
University Press, 1938, pp. 578.

THE LAW OF TREATIES.

469
New York: Columbia

Vice-Chancellor McNair, of the University of Liverpool, formerly Professor of International Law at the University of Cambridge, England, in the
midst of one of the greatest orgies of tieaty repudiation in history, gives us a
scholarly treatise on the law of treaties. The timeliness, therefore, of this
really distinguished work is impressive.
In the foreign offices of the various governments of the world, where the
determination of obligations under treaties is being generally subordinated to
the advancement of particular local policies, it will come as a wholesome surprise to realize that there exists at hand a fully developed system of law with
respect to treaty obligations.
Professor McNair has been thorough, giving the rules governing the formation of treaties, the interpretation of their terms, the effect of their operations,
and the manner of their modification and termination. Of course, he writes
only from the point of view of the decisions made by the English courts and
the English diplomatic officers. But an examination of the contents of the
treatise will show a close affinity between British views and our own.
The book proceeds more by example than by precept. The author states
his conclusion and then produces copious illustrations from the history of
English diplomacy to show the manner in which the rules he lays down have
been applied in practice. By this empiric method he produces a thoroughly
authenticated result, from which one derives a feeling of authority. This is,
therefore, a book not to read but to study; a treatise designed to prove conclusions rather than merely to state them; a scientific effort to demonstrate that
over a long period of history there has existed a course of conduct, recognized
by law, under which agreements between nations may be given effective legal
sanction.
No discussion of treaties of current interest could possibly be complete
without some reference to the position of the German Government with respect
to its post-war treaty obligations. Professor McNair points out that in the
Treaty of Versailles the German Government was compelled to treat as null
and void a number of treaties which she had induced other states to conclude,
"inmany cases doubtless under the coercion resulting from successful military
competition." At the same time the British Government has never given the
slightest assent to the suggestion that the German Government itself, which had
no alternative but to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, had any justification for
treating that convention as not absolutely binding upon it. Nor has the British
Government attached any greater significance officially to the position of the
German Government that it was not bound by the disarmament provisions of
the Treaty of Versailles because they had failed of their general objective to
bring about a general state of disarmament.
When one bears in mind, however, that this official attitude on the part of
the British Foreign Office has not been effectively asserted, either because of
the unwillingness of the British Government to resort to the only ultimate available sanction against spirited repudiation of treaties, or because of other considerations of policy, it will be apparent that the "law in books" with regard to
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treaty obligations falls far short of giving a true picture of the "law in action".
The wholesale repudiation of treaties in times of stress must not, in the
light of the data collected in this book, be deemed a failure of international law.
It must rather be construed as the prevalence, for the time being, of new forces
which make necessary the avoidance of accepted legal principles. The same
thing happens in private law when unforeseen circumstances bring about legislative moratoria that interfere with normal enforcement of the obligations of
contract. One cannot be pedantic about any legal principle because it is of
utmost importance to realize that behind every decision of a court or other
tribunal stand the economic, political and social forces of the world. It is only
through the light of these that a true appreciation of the course of law can
be had at all.
At least in democratic countries, however, the effort to return at the earliest
possible moment to the rule of the strict law in private matters is constantly
being made. It is of equal importance that in international affairs a similar
effort be put forth with utmost force. The task of enforcement in private law
is difficult in many cases and frequently impossible where the law is out of tune
with the social desires, as, for example, in the case of national prohibition in
the United States. So, too, in international affairs treaties negotiated, which
do not have a solid basis in the expression of the wishes of the peoples who are
to be bound by them, will find the rule's enforcement difficult, if not impossible,
to achieve.
These are the lessons of history, but they make all the more important the
true understanding of the law of treaties. In this book Professor McNair has
made a complete and distinguished contribution to that subject.
MAURICE FINRELSTEIN.*

LAW Is JUSTICE: NOTABLE OPINIONS OF MR. JUSTICE CARIOZO.
L. Sainer. New York: Ad Press, 1938, pp. xv, 441.
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Mr. Hendrick Van Loon in The Arts says that the poet is one who expresses his dreams in universal rhythm, which perhaps is another way of
expressing Socrates' concept of "beauty in the inward soul". No reading, even
the most cursory, of Justice Cardozo's opinions can fail to convey the impression of the attunement of his soul to the universal rhythm. He himself has
likened the work of a judge to that of an artist, who, although he must know
the handbooks, should never trust them for his guidance. On the basis of Mr.
Van Loon's definition, we may permissibly classify Justice. Cardozo not only
as a great artist but also as a poet.
The opinions, drawn from Justice Cardozo's eighteen years on the bench
of the New York Court of Appeals, and his more than five years as a member
of the United States Supreme Court, illustrate the striking feature of his supremacy in two divergent fields of the law. The work of the two courts is of
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